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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
All the aforesaid, of course, does not mean that foreign exchange
control is advocated, but it probably does indicate that such restric-
tions will not be ignored a limine. Exchange control is one of many
tentative and supposed remedial devices for clear and present evils.
It is the hope of all who long for a free world that all artificial ob-
stacles hampering free communication among the nations of the world
will be abolished and, of course, foreign exchange restrictions are a
species of such artificial hindrances. Still, for the time being, they
do exist all over the world-even in many countries which apply
standards of thinking, morality, and freedom similar to those applied
here.
A cautious approach to the problem is recommended. Since the
effect given in our courts to foreign exchange restrictions is closely
bound up with international relations, no position should be taken
without careful consideration of possible repercussions in that sphere.
On the other hand, the protection of American interests, and the basic
principles of our public policy should not be sacrificed to this latter
consideration.
ANDREW FRIEDMANN.*
DUTY OF A DIRECTOR NOT TO COMPETE
Manifestly, free enterprise is vital to the position of the United
States as a world power. For this reason, encouragement of com-
petition is deemed to be in the best interests of the community, and
monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade are prohibited as
contrary to public policy. Notwithstanding the obvious advantages
of free competition, certain business and personal relationships are
carefully scrutinized by the courts because in some circumstances,
by nature of the trust reposed in one individual by another, unfair
advantage may be taken by the one in whom the trust is reposed unless
he act in utmost good faith.
The corporation, as an institution, was created to serve business
needs, and has proved extremely valuable to businessmen. In fact,
in the manufacturing, communication and service industries, over 90%
of the business volume is carried on by corporations.
The question naturally arises: What is a corporation? Various
definitions have been advanced, but perhaps the one that best ex-
presses the vacillating concepts indicative of the relations between the
artificial person [the corporation] and the natural persons who neces-
* Doctor Juris and Doctor Rerum Politicarum, University of Budapest,
1938; Member of Budapest Bar, 1942-48; LL.B., St. John's University, 1951.
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NOTES AND COMMENT
sarily are part and parcel of this legal fiction, is stated in the famous
case of Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Pierson, wherein the court
said: ".... a corporation is more nearly a method than a thing, and
... the law ... may treat it as a name for a useful collection of jural
relations, each one of which must in every instance be ascertained,
analyzed, and assigned to its appropriate place according to the cir-
cumstances of the particular case, having due regard to the purpose
to be achieved .... .1
Corporations, being artificial persons, must act through natural
persons. The management of a corporation is vested in its board of
directors. This relationship between director and corporation gives
rise to many duties. The director, however, will sometimes find these
duties to be in conflict with other personal interests. This note will
concern itself with the duties incumbent upon the director where he
is thus placed in the position of serving two interests.
In analyzing the position of a director of a business corporation,
it is clear that he, strictly speaking, is neither a trustee nor an agent.
He occupies a sui generis status.2 Like a trustee or agent, he does,
nevertheless, stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its
stockholders. 3 By virtue of that fact, "[c] orporate officers and direc-
tors are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to
further their private interests. . . . The rule that requires an un-
divided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there
shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest. The occasions for
the determination of honesty, good faith and loyal conduct are many
and varied, and no hard and fast rule can be formulated. The stan-
dard of loyalty is measured by no fixed scale .... 4 Nevertheless,
it is necessary to have some conception of where the line will be drawn
between a permissible self-interest and a breach of fiduciary respon-
sibility. In attempting to find that point, the burden may be sim-
plified by dividing the problem into its various aspects, viz., (1) the
director's appropriation to himself of opportunities properly belonging
to his corporation; (2) the director's use of his influence to prevent
his corporation from competing with an enterprise in which he has
an interest; (3) the director's unauthorized use of corporate facilities
to advance his personal interests; and (4) the director's engaging,
or having an interest in another enterprise which may engage, in
direct competition with his corporation.
I Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, 130 Misc. 110, 119, 222 N. Y.
Supp. 532, 543 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
2 Fuller, Restrictions Imposed by the Directorship Status on the Personal
Business Actidties of Directors, 26 WASH. U. L. Q. 189 (1941).
3 Gamlen Chemical Co. v. Gamlen, 79 F. Supp. 622, 631 (W. D. Pa. 1948);
Young v. Columbia Oil Co., 110 W. Va. 364, 158 S. E. 678 (1931).
4 Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A. 2d 503, 510 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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Appropriating Corporate Opportunities
The rule is firmly established that a director may not appro-
priate to himself corporate opportunities. 5 "The fundamental ques-
tion in each case is whether the officer or director of a corporation
has permitted his self-interest to conflict with the interests of the cor-
poration. Where a business opportunity is in the line of the corpo-
ration's activities,. . . the opportunity, as one in which it has a legiti-
mate interest or expectancy, belongs to the corporation and not to
its officers or directors ... but, where the opportunity is one in which
the corporation has no interest or expectancy, the opportunity is not
a corporate, but a personal, one. .. ." 6 What constitutes a corporate
opportunity is a question of fact, to be determined by the facts and
circumstances existent at the time the alleged opportunity arose, and
not by events occurring subsequently.7
It has been held that no corporate opportunity existed when the
corporation declined an offer because of legal barriers; 8 or when it
was the settled policy of the corporation not to engage in a particular
line of business; 0 or when it declined the opportunity because of
business reasons; L or when the opportunity was not truly available
to the corporation either because a party had refused to deal with it,
or because the corporation sought without success to obtain it."
If, on the other hand, a corporate opportunity was found to exist
and it was appropriated by a director, he will be required to account
to the corporation for the profits realized from the wrongful appro-
priation. The case of Averill v. Barber'12 well illustrates this rule.
In a stockholders' derivative action, defendant directors were charged
with acquiring and using for their personal benefit patents that right-
fully belonged to the corporation. Affirming the lower court opinion,
the court stated, "It was proper to decree that the defendants Barber,
McLain, and Langdon should account for and pay over all profits
realized by them out of their purchase of the De Smedt patents, which
they assumed to acquire for themselves individually when they
5 Diedrick v. Helm, 217 Minn. 483, 14 N. W. 2d 913 (1944) ; Lutherland,
Inc. v. Dahlen, 357 Pa. 143, 53 A. 2d 143 (1947).6 Diedrick v. Helm, 217 Minn. 483, 14 N. W. 2d 913, 919 (1944).
7The court should ".... look at the facts as they exist at the time of their
occurrence, not aided or enlightened by those which subsequently took place.. .. "
Purdy v. Lynch, 145 N. Y. 462, 475, 40 N. E. 232, 236 (1895). For an inter-
esting analysis of judicial application of this rule, compare McCandless v. Fur-
land, 296 U. S. 140 (1935), with Old Dominion Mining and Smelting Co. v.
Lewisohn, 210 U. S. 206 (1908).
8 Thilco Timber Co. v. Sawyer, 236 Mich. 401, 210 N. W. 204 (1926).
9Lancaster Loose Leaf Tobacco Co. v. Robinson, 199 Ky.. 313, 250 S. W.
997 (1923).
'D Lincoln Stores, Inc. v. Grant, 309 Mass. 417, 34 N. E. 2d 704 (1941).
II Bisbee v. Midland Linseed Products Co., 19 F. 2d 24 (8th Cir. 1927).
126 N. Y. Supp. 255 (Sup. Ct. 1889).
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ought to have acquired them for the American Asphalt Paving
Company....
Resignation of a director after learning of the opportunity will
not absolve him from liability for a subsequent pre-emption thereof.1 4
Likewise, a director of a solvent corporation cannot take over a cor-
poration's contract on the plea of its financial inability to perform, 15
nor can a director secure to himself leases 16 or properties 17 for the
purpose of subsequent resale to the corporation for a personal profit.1 8
Director's Prevention of Corporate Competition
Just as a director may not appropriate to himself corporate op-
portunities, he is also prohibited from actively using his position and
power over the corporation to prevent it from seeking business in
competition with him," A strong application of this rule is found
in the case of Singer v. Carlisle.20 There the defendants were di-
rectors of a corporation engaged in the business of security under-
writing. At the same time, defendants were also interested in several
banking firms engaged in the same business. Plaintiff-stockholders,
in a derivative action, sought to charge the defendants with liability
for preventing the corporation from competing with the banking con-
cerns. An allegation that the directors actively used their influence
over the corporation to prevent competition with the banks was suffi-
cient to sustain the complaint.
Use of Corporate Facilities
Since the corporation is an independent legal entity, distinct and
apart from its stockholders, 21 its property and the use thereof is re-
served to the corporation alone, and a director may not make use of
corporate facilities to promote his personal interests if such interests
'
3 Id. at 260.
14Albert A. Volk Co. v. Fleschner Bros., Inc., 60 N. Y. S. 2d 244 (Sup.
Ct. 1945).1 Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F. 2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934).
16H. C. Girard Co. v. Lamoureux, 227 Mass. 277, 116 N. E. 572 (1917).
But cf. Critterdon & Cowler Co. v. Cowler, 66 App. Div. 95, 72 N. Y. Supp.
701 (3d Dep't 1901).
17 Blake v. Buffalo Creek R. R., 56 N. Y. 485 (1874).
18 See N. Y. GEx. Coiu. LAw § 60. "Action against officers of corporation
for misconduct. An action may be brought against one or more of the direc-
tors ... of a corporation to procure judgment for the following relief or any
part thereof: ... 2. To compel them to pay to the corporation or its creditors,
any money and the value of any property, which they have acquired to them-
selves, or transferred to others . . . by or through any neglect of or failure
to perform or other violation of their duties."
19 Singer v. Carlisle, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 172 (Sup. Ct. 1940). Cf. Starling
Industries v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., 298 N. Y. 483, 84 N. E. 2d 790 (1949).
20 26 N. Y. S. 2d 172 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
21Button v. Hoffman, 61 Wis. 20, 20 N. W. 667 (1884).
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are separate from those of the corporation. 22  Unauthorized use of
facilities has led to the imposition of a constructive trust upon all the
profits realized from such wrongful appropriation. In Red Top Cab
Co. v. Hanchett,23 plaintiff corporation sued defendant, former direc-
tor of plaintiff, for breach of fiduciary duty. While Hanchett was a
director, he organized a competing cab company, and, in the early
stages of development, used the facilities of the Red Top Cab Com-
pany. He also induced key personnel to leave plaintiff's employ and
work for the competing company. Plaintiff sought and was granted
equitable relief in the form of a constructive trust. The court stated:
"The evidence in the present case leaves no room for doubt that de-
fendant, in organizing his competing business, knowingly crippled and
injured the plaintiff company, depriving it of selected personnel and
using its facilities in the launching of his own project." 24
It must be recognized that the use of corporate facilities usually
results from the conflict between the director's personal interest and
that of his corporation. Therefore, in cases dealing with the use of
corporate facilities, this conflict of interest will ordinarily be involved.
For purposes of clarity then, the decisions must be analyzed to de-
termine whether liability was predicated upon the appropriation of
corporate opportunities, use of corporate facilities, or a combination
of both.2
5
Engaging in Direct Competition
There is no rule of law which prohibits a director from engaging
in an independent enterprise, notwithstanding the possibility of such
enterprise affording the corporation competition.26 This is clearly
illustrated in New York Automobile Co. v. Franklin.27 There W was
employed by the plaintiff corporation to design a car and was elected
a director. Although he completed designs for two cars, the plaintiff
never entered into production of these designs, seemingly because of
an inability to obtain capital. Subsequently, W entered into a similar
arrangement with the Franklin Corporation and designed two dif-
ferent automobiles. It was proven that W did not incorporate any
of the previous designs into those made for the defendant. The plain-
tiff attempted to impress a trust upon the profits realized. Judge
Andrews, speaking for the court, said, "But I know of no rule which
prohibits a director of a corporation engaging in a business similar to
22 As to the possibilities of criminal prosecution, see People v. Ashworth,
220 App. Div. 498, 222 N. Y. Supp. 24 (4th Dep't 1927); N. Y. PENAL LAW§§ 1290, 1290-a.
23 48 F. 2d 236 (N. D. Cal. 1931).
24 Id. at 238.
25 See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A. 2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; Red
Top Cab Co. v. Hanchett, 48 F. 2d 236 (N. D. Cal. 1931).
26 Carper v. Frost Oil Co., 72 Colo. 345, 211 Pac. 370 (1922).
27 49 Misc. 8, 97 N. Y. Supp. 781 (Sup. Ct. 1905).
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that carried on by the corporation either in his own behalf or for
another corporation of which he is likewise a director.
"True, he owes to his stockholders the most scrupulous good
faith.... He may not deal in his own behalf in respect to any matter
involving his rights and duties as a director. He may not seek his
own profit at the expense of the company or its stockholders. But,
so long as he violates no legal or moral duty which he owes to the
corporation or its stockholders, he is entirely free to engage in an
independent competitive business." 28
Broderick v. Blanton 29 affords an illustration of what may ap-
pear to be a contrary view. There defendants were directors and
employees of a liquor corporation engaged in distilling and bottling
liquor. They purchased bulk whiskey for purposes of personal specu-
lation. Generally, these liquor stocks were first offered to the cor-
poration, but were rejected by defendants acting for the corporation.
The plaintiffs, in a shareholders' derivative action, alleged that the
defendants breached their employment contracts requiring them to
devote their full time to the corporation and not to engage in any
other or competing business, and also breached the fiduciary respon-
sibilities of corporate directors. Defendants proved that the corpora-
tion never bought manufactured whiskey except on rare occasions to
meet inventory requirements. It was shown that the purchases were
not necessary for the corporation, and its financial condition forbade
speculation. The court ruled that "[t] he acts of defendants were thus
in no sense competitive with the business of the corporation. In
fine, the business of the corporation was not interfered with or af-
fected in any way by the acts of defendants and no true corporate
opportunity was thereby lost." 30 After discussing the fact that the
instant transactions were trivial when compared with the million-
dollar business of the corporation and that the defendants made no
use of corporate facilities, the court added, "... liability may ensue
• ..where there has been wrongful pre-emption of true corporate
opportunity, or advantage taken of corporate needs or property, or
unfairness, interference, or competition with the corporation. None
of these circumstances are here present .... ,, " (Italics supplied.)
It is submitted that the suggestion that liability might be predi-
cated on the mere existence of direct competition may be explained
by the fact that the defendants in this case were more than directors.
They were the paid purchasing agents of the corporation, and the
duties required of agents are not the same as the duties required of
directors. Otherwise, this dictum would run counter to the current
of authority.32 Admittedly, the rule allowing a director to compete is
28 Id. at 14, 97 N. Y. Supp. at 785.
29 59 N. Y. S. 2d 136 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
3 0 Id. at 138.
31 Id. at 139.
32 See note 26 mtpra.
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usually qualified by adding that he ". . . could not in good faith en-
gage in a rival business to its [his corporation's] detriment." 33
The only reasonable interpretation of this qualification is that it
prohibits the director from appropriating corporate opportunities, pre-
venting his corporation from competing with an enterprise in which
he has an interest, or using corporate facilities to advance his personal
interests. Were it otherwise, modern-day directors often serving for
a token compensation, and sitting on the boards of many corporations,
often engaged in competing enterprises, would be reluctant to subject
themselves to such a crushing burden of liability which ensues when
the director breaches his fiduciary duty.
Recognition of this prevalent practice in corporate management
has resulted in the evolution of a new rule regarding the validity of
transactions entered into between corporations having common
directors. Previously, intercorporate executory contracts effected
through common directors (even one) could be avoided by the cor-
poration without cause.34 Today, "[d]irectorship in two competing
corporations does not, in and of itself, constitute a wrong. It is only
when a business opportunity arises which places the director in a
position of serving two masters, and when, dominated by one, he
neglects his duty to the other, that a wrong has been done." 35 There-
fore, fraud or imposition because of this dual position, must be proven
before the contract can be repudiated.86
Conclusion
Whether or not the above-stated rules 'best serve the needs of
the business world is a matter of conjecture. Management and own-
ership are devolving upon completely separate groups.3 7 In the com-
plex system of corporate enterprise, the stockholder is often left to
the mercy of scheming directors. Of necessity, equity must protect
his interests by securing from the director-fiduciary an "undivided
loyalty" free from the ". . . 'disintegrating erosion' of particular ex-
ceptions .. , 88 Balancing these equitable considerations are the
requirements of efficient business administration. Allowing directors
to engage in competing enterprises is supported by the argument that
the best directors are often selected from those already engaged in
the same or similar businesses. The validity of this reasoning may
be justly questioned by the plight of the unsuspecting stockholder.
33 Coleman v. Hanger, 210 Ky. 309, 275 S. W. 784, 789 (1925).
34 See Burden v. Burden, 159 N. Y. 287, 307, 54 N. E. 17, 23 (1899) ; cf.
Jacobson v. Brooklyn Lumber Co., 184 N. Y. 152, 76 N. E. 1075 (1906).
35 Singer v. Carlisle, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 172, 182 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
36 Everett v. Phillips, 288 N. Y. 227, 43 N. E. 2d 18 (1942) ; accord, Globe
Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Electric Co., 224 N. Y. 483, 121 N. E. 378 (1918).
37 See note 41 infra.38Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 464, 164 N. E. 545, 546 (1928).
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It is submitted that directors should be required to make full dis-
closure of their conflicting interests and that such information be
available to the stockholders and creditors of the corporation, with a
statutory penalty for noncompliance.
Another remedy is suggested in the case of Simonson v.
Helburn,3 9 where a corporation conducting theatrical plays permitted
administrative directors to engage in personal ventures, provided the
question of competition with the corporation was first passed on by
an umpire. The court held this a valid and commendable device to
protect both director and corporation before any harm is done. Con-
flicting interests should be brought into the open; for it is difficult
to perceive the value of secrecy in promoting business efficiency.
Corporation law does not exist in the abstract; the word cor-
poration ". . . has a variable, not a constant, meaning. The rights
and obligations that are comprised within the compass of the word
[corporation] change not only with time, but with locality." 40 The
corporate form of enterprise is designed to serve the community at
large and not a small group of entrepreneurs. The expansion of our
economy has produced an entirely new corporate structure,4 ' and
the law must adjust to the complexities of that economy and the new
corporate structure incident thereto to protect the interests of all
those involved. Only in this way will it perpetuate the efficiency
which is the cornerstone of our material strength.
DUAL EDUCATION V. CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE
Introduction
When Chief Justice Taney wrote his celebrated opinion in the
famous Dred Scott decision,' he argued that the foundation of the
American State had not included the Negro as a participating ele-
ment or as a beneficiary of its privileges. 2 Union victory in the Civil
War and the subsequent adoption of constitutional amendments
purporting to give the Negro equal status with the whites have de-
stroyed the legal efficacy of that ruling,3 but in our southern states,
39 198 Misc. 430, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
40 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, 130 Misc. 110, 119, 222 N. Y.
Supp. 532, 544 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
41For a detailed analysis of the economic aspects of this problem, see
BERa & MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PaIVATE PRoPERTY (1933).
1 Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (U. S. 1856).
2Id. at 407; BOND, EDUCAT ON OF THE NEGRO IN THE AmmERICAN SOCIAL
OiuER 3 (1934).
3 This is not to imply that the Dred Scott decision no longer has value
as a legal precedent. See MoTT, DUE PRocEss OF LAW 329 (1926).
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